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Abstract: 
The goal of philosophical method is the construction of a comprehensive policy 
argument (CPA) for a public policy or legal issue. In addition to the conventional 
use of empirical models and their logic of investigation in the study of policy and 
law, CPA requires that an underlying philosophical logic of concepts be 
deciphered in terms of the ideas within the issue, their definition, overlap and 
systematic interdependence. In this working paper, I will employ a logic of 
concepts from the philosophical system of David Hume to provide a unique and 
more complete logic of legal investigation for the illumination of the International 
Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons. 
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Public Order Principles, Philosophical Method and the 
International Law of Nuclear Weapons 
 
In 1995, in an advisory opinion for the United Nations General Assembly, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) refused to recognize the use of nuclear weapons as illegal. 
This conclusion was reached despite a review of international law that emphasized essential 
harms to humanity and nature and the violations of rights considered from within the law of 
armed conflict, global humanitarian law and the international law of the environment. The failure 
of the ICJ to promote essential values over state sovereignty is not new. In 1951, the ICJ allowed 
reservations to the Genocide Treaty. In 1966 it refused to intercede on behalf of the people of 
southwest Africa to stop the imposition of apartheid by their trustee, the South African 
government. Most recently, the ICJ quashed an arrest warrant issued for crimes against humanity 
by the state of Belgium against the former minister of foreign affairs of the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo.  
All of the above decisions involve the Court’s assumption that the practice of 
international law elevates the blackletter rules of the international system, over its other 
component: a category of legal norms and rules that involve peremptory rights or obligations to 
the international community above and beyond state sovereignty. Since its modern inception, 
shortly after World War I, international law has been reluctant to fully integrate these 
peremptory norms and obligations transcendent of the state, into its positive law or 
jus dispositivum. These norms, dealing with those factors necessary to the dignity of humanity-
in-the-person, come in two types: jus cogens principles and erga omnes obligations. Together, 
these two categories of potential legal rules represent that part of international legal practice not 
subject to the dispensation of state parties. According to the ICJ opinion in the Barcelona 
Traction case, these norms include banning slavery, the slave trade, genocide, torture and piracy. 
However, in addition, jus cogens and erga omnes are meant to encompass a wider field of 
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‘essential’ legal concerns,1 including a prohibition on the use of force, self-defense, self-
determination, fundamental human rights and the basic principles of both humanitarian and 
international environmental law.
2
 Consequently, in a case like the ICJ Advisory Opinion on the 
Legality of Nuclear Weapons, the Court’s examination of human rights, humanitarian and 
environmental law should have generated peremptory norms, that, when judged against a state’s 
use of nuclear weapons, would prove peremptory of that practice. Why didn’t it?  
Even with a complete examination of all of the customary and treaty law of these areas of 
practice, the Court could find nothing to make the use of nuclear weapons illegal. In fact, 
Nuclear Weapons supports the argument that the number of these ‘right to force’ precepts has 
not been significantly enlarged since their inception within customary international law in the 
nineteenth century when the erga omnes obligation against piracy and the jus cogens rules 
against slavery and the slave trade, were codified as peremptory. 
Empirically, one can argue that the Court was simply applying the law. In addition, one 
could contend that the expansion of the field of peremptory norms is controversial and that 
reasonable argument differs on where the line is drawn. But this simply begs the question of why 
the international legal system, in practice, is not quick to recognize basic critical principles that 
have all the characteristics of peremptory status. To simply say that power and interest have 
conspired against an enlargement of jus cogens principles and erga omnes obligations, or that 
this is simply the way the positive law of nations works, is to indulge in what Diderot defined as 
“the sophism of the ephemeral”, or what Allott calls “the disempowering idea that what happens 
to exist now is inevitable and permanent.”3 In order to both understand why this particular set of 
critical international legal precepts have been retarded in their full integration into the positive 
law of nations, and to detect the options for changing these conditions, I will apply philosophical 
method to decipher the underlying character of international legal practice so that its empirical 
reality can be made more transparent.  
                                                          
1
 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford 2007) at 81. 
2
 Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law (Oxford 2006), Chapter 2. 
3
 Allott, Health of Nations (Cambridge 2002) at 154. 
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First, I shall describe the practice of international law and the strata of its legal system. 
Second, I will suggest a different perspective provided by the philosophical method of R.G. 
Collingwood and the philosophical-policy of David Hume. Lastly, I will examine the Advisory 
Opinion on the Use of Nuclear Weapons from this perspective to illuminate the underlying 
structure of the international legal system that creates the reality where jus cogens principles and 
erga omnes obligations are slow to be codified. (I have created a figure that may help to 
conceptualize what is about to follow; see p. 26.) 
Public Order Norms In International Law 
Basically, transnational public law exists in three recognized sources: principle, treaty 
and general or customary international law.
4
 But, in addition to the ‘blackletter’ law that they 
generate, the legal system contains an international public policy process which provides it with 
both an inventory of competitive norms and arguments for legal change, as well as a valid 
evolutionary process by which to progressively codify or update positive practice. This policy, or 
‘public order process’, is a recognized component of the international legal system. Beginning 
with the assumption that “[p]ublic policy is a concept derived from law not from politics”5, 
international tribunals, including the ICJ, have recognized that international law is more than 
those rules and norms existing in blackletter law but includes “…generally recognized principles 
of morality which are not necessarily part of positive law.”6 
Traditionally, the public policy process integrates the three sources of law to form two 
strata of legal rules: jus dispositivum and jus cogens. The former, translated from the Latin as 
“law subject to the dispensation of the parties” is defined through the voluntary law of treaty and 
custom. Jus dispositivum means “the law adopted by consent”. This category of international law 
consists of rules derived from the reciprocal relations of states, it is a body of permissive and 
                                                          
4
 According to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the sources of international law are: “a. 
international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting 
states; b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c. the general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations.” 
5
 Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law at 12. 
6
 Kuwait Air Corp., 116 ILR 571. See also Kegel, Internationales Privatrcht (1987), 326. 
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voluntary international law created, more or less, at a state’s discretion.7 It is founded on the self-
interest of the participating states. Therefore, jus dispositivum binds only those states consenting 
to be governed by it. Within this category of the law, states may derogate from the rules, sources 
of law that are of more recent origin are generally accepted as more authoritative, and specific 
rules (i.e., lex specialis), take precedence over general rules (i.e., legi generali). 
Jus cogens is the superior strata of the positive law which contains not only peremptory 
principle but erga omnes obligations. It translates as “compelling law” and these rules “are not 
just binding but operate in an absolute and unconditional way.”8 These are peremptory 
principles, non-derogable, and not subject to considerations of state consent. These norms are 
characterized by the absolute value of their inherent content, and exist to protect individual and 
community interests that are transcendent of the state. With erga omnes obligation, or 
compelling duties of states on behalf of international society, “[t]he absolute nature of jus cogens 
makes irrelevant the pleas of reciprocity and circumstances precluding wrongfulness, such as 
necessity.”9 Currently, international blackletter law has codified prohibitions against genocide, 
slavery, and aggressive warfare as jus cogens and freedom of the seas with the obligation to 
inhibit piracy as erga omnes obligations. These precepts, as codified in the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties
10
 (which is declaratory of custom), and in critical ICJ cases like 
Barcelona Traction, possess a higher status than jus dispositivum in the jurisprudence of 
international law. Once a value becomes a rule or obligation under jus cogens or erga omnes, it 
cannot legally accommodate a state opting-out or derogating through private agreements, 
domestic statutes, or bilateral/ multilateral treaties. 
                                                          
7
 First fully defined in the writings of Grotius and Vattel. 
8
 Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law at 67. 
9
 Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law at 69. 
10
 Article 53: Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law (“jus cogens”)--- A treaty is 
void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the 
purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and 
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted 
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character. And 
Article 64: Emergence of a new peremptory norm of general international law (“jus cogens”)--- If a new peremptory 
norm of general international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and 
terminates. 
  Public Order Principles, Philosophical Method, Nuclear Weapons    9 
 
The Lens of Philosophical Method 
The goal of philosophical method is the construction of a comprehensive policy argument 
(CPA) for a public policy or legal issue. In addition to the conventional use of empirical models 
and their logic of investigation in the study of policy and law, CPA requires that an underlying 
philosophical logic of concepts be deciphered in terms of the ideas within the issue, their 
definition, overlap and systematic interdependence. Philosophical method is a means with which 
to interpret and understand competing systematic and complete conceptual logics both existing at 
the core of an issue and pertinent to policy change.  
Philosophical method,11 derived by R.G. Collingwood as a supplement to social scientific 
method, offers a distinct perspective on legal practice. First, it suggests that the investigator 
should focus on universals rather than particulars. This recommends that one examine the law in 
terms, not of any one specific component but, architectonically, as a whole, interrelated system 
of concepts. Second, it assumes that the concepts of this holistic logic will not be classifiable into 
exclusive categories for study but will overlap dialectically. For example, one is not able to study 
theory without a simultaneous consciousness of practice, or the normative dimensions of a 
question without understanding their overlap with the empirical parameters of the issue. Third, 
philosophical method assumes that this systemic logic of overlapping, dialectic, concepts (in our 
case international law), exists on an evolutionary scale of forms where the tension between ideas 
and institutions sorts the various inherent dialectics into a metaphysics of absolute and relative 
presuppositions which change as different balance points occur within their dialectic structure.  
On a scale of forms, it is not the discovery of new concepts or theories that is the task of 
the analyst, but the refinement of knowledge. From the standpoint of philosophical method, all 
empirical phenomena are created from sets of dialectically-related presuppositions, where one is 
absolute and the others relative. Any particular reality or ‘moment’ of that phenomena is the 
result of the specific balance of overlapping dialectics in a particular context. Here, the job of 
each generation of philosophers is to refine the existing logic of concepts in response to the 
demands of the evolution of those concepts in one’s contemporary circumstances, in effect 
deciphering the continuity or discontinuity of ideas. For the relationship between policy and law, 
                                                          
11
 As described in R.G. Collingwood, An Essay on Philosophical Method (Oxford 1933). 
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philosophical method would predict that every empirical logic of investigation is a superstructure 
for an inherent philosophical logic of overlapping and dialectic concepts. Deciphering the 
substructure of these empirical moments and their continuity is the task of legal study. 
But given the empirical complexity of sources and strata that is international legal 
practice, how can one begin to decipher and elevate the underlying logic of concepts that is 
international law? The key is to use any number of pre-existing philosophical systems that have 
already worked through the complicated maze of overlapping concepts to create competing 
systematic arguments for social life and the law. Although philosophers like Immanuel Kant, 
G.W.F. Hegel or David Hume may not have produced specific theories for each and every facet 
of human social interaction, they did something better and unusual from a twenty-first century 
perspective: they created comprehensive and systematic philosophical arguments about 
humanity, its nature, and the application of practical reason in the empirical world. They 
compiled intricate and well reasoned arguments that offer ready-made logical systems of 
concepts, that potentially can be used, when paired with a specific investigational or empirical 
logic, to create alternative paradigms for the study of international law and policy. 
But even with these conceptual logics worked out, they are so intricate and cover so 
many topics related to the human condition, that a way has to be found to focus on the specific 
theoretical requirements of, for example, international law and its public order process. This is 
where the two-step process that is philosophical-policy and legal design is useful. First, to turn a 
comprehensive philosophical argument into a policy paradigm for application to the law, we 
need to sort the logical system of the philosopher into those categories that inform the generic 
substructure of law and policy arguments. These, I argue,
12
 require that the investigator apply the 
methodological categories of philosophical method to the philosopher’s line of reasoning so as to 
decipher the fundamental assumptions and core principle(s) of the legal-policy argument. I 
contend that there are three fundamental assumptions: the definition of the person; the character 
of the collective action problem; and the role of the state in terms of law and the definition of 
justice. The core principle is that single precept that represents the interaction of the fundamental 
                                                          
12
 John Martin Gillroy, Justice and Nature: Kantian Philosophy, Environmental Policy and The Law (Georgetown 
2000). 
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assumptions as defined by that philosophical argument. For example, with Kant the core 
principle is autonomy; for Hegel it is freedom; for Hume, it is the passion for society and for the 
market paradigm it is Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.  
In the second step in the process one applies the philosophical-policy to the context of the 
practice under scrutiny. In effect, this makes the philosophical system a philosophical-policy 
paradigm applied within a legal design space. I call this legal design because the prior logic of 
the philosophical system is applied both to understand the policy process as it exists and then to 
decipher the flaws within its logic and the means of change given the ramifications of the status-
quo. This illuminates the empirical reality in terms of its underlying philosophical 
presuppositions (i.e., absolute and relative) so that the analysis of policy and law becomes a 
matter of utilizing the underlying imperatives of the philosophical-policy to create a legal design 
space. Here, the idiosyncrasies of the law are no longer just assumed or ignored but explained by 
an understanding of the ideas that have created, and are simultaneously created by, the facts of 
legal practice and institutions. 
Philosophical method is not meant to be a replacement for the empirical investigation of a 
policy or legal issue, or the use of scientific method in social studies. Rather, it is a prerequisite 
and complimentary method that seeks a more complete understanding of the philosophical 
presuppositions of positivist ideas like power, interest, or strategic rationality. Philosophical 
method is meant to be used with the facts of the policy or legal issue in an effort to match an 
illuminating logic of concepts with a pertinent logic of investigation. Within the CPA, the use of 
philosophical method and the deciphering of the metaphysics of a policy or legal issue is 
assumed to be critical to the full understanding of the overlapping concepts, dialectics, and scale 
of forms that determines, and is determined by, the empirical context of the policy or legal topic.  
Hume’s Philosophical-Policy and the Public Order Process: The Logic of 
Concepts 
Why Hume? Because every superficial empirical logic of investigation requires an 
essential logic of concepts in order that the full delineation of those philosophical concepts 
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essential to an understanding of the policy or legal issue, its systematic nature, and what is at 
stake in the analysis, is provided as an interdependent component of the study of policy and law. 
In the specific case of international law, Hume provides a logic of philosophical concepts 
that fulfills the requirements for a fuller understanding of the origin and evolution of law from 
social convention; a more adequate delineation of the overlapping concepts of the law in terms of 
the ideas and institutions that deal with norms and justice (e.g., principle, process, practice, rule, 
power, interest); an understanding of the essential dialectics at the core of a conceptualization of 
the law with both unconscious and conscious human participation (i.e., passionreason, 
processprinciple); the establishment of an evolutionary scale of forms based on these dialectics 
that conceptualizes law as applied practical reason creating both a two-stage legal system where 
principle, within its dialectic with process, has the opportunity to redress an inherent process-
bias, and a fuller and more systematic explanation of the presuppositions of the concept of 
sovereignty, than positivist models, alone, can provide. 
David Hume’s philosophical argument for human nature offers a whole system of 
overlapping concepts on a scale of forms that can be used to illuminate the inherent logic of 
concepts at the origins of modern international law.
 13
 Hume’s philosophical logic of concepts is 
useful because of its understanding of the genesis of human social cooperation and the evolution 
of sanctions, including law, that rise to secure it.
14
 Hume argues that all legal practice originates 
as social convention and this provides a reasonable origin story for international law. As a 
philosophical-policy paradigm, applied through legal design, it can provide us with a systematic 
metaphysical map capable of illuminating the origin and evolution of international law and the 
inherent tension between the policy and law of the international legal system that are manifest in 
practice. 
                                                          
13
 John Martin Gillroy, “Philosophical-Policy and International Dispute Settlement: ProcessPrinciple And The 
Ascendance of the WTO’s Concept Of Justice”, 3 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 53: 59-73 (2012) and 
“Justice-As-Sovereignty: David Hume and The Origins Of International Law” British Year Book of International 
Law. 79: 429-479 (2007). 
14
 This was after the application of philosophical method to a cross-section of philosophical systems including those 
of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and Aquinas.  
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To sort Hume’s philosophical argument into a philosophical-policy paradigm required 
locating his fundamental assumptions and core precept. Specifically, for Hume, the fundamental 
assumptions dealing with the affect of context or circumstance on the individual, and the 
requirements of collective action to establish a stable, certain, and ordered existence that 
encourages the public good, is regulated by a single human “passion” or core precept: the 
individual’s need for society.15 In Hume’s argument, the person is universally and necessarily 
motivated to establish and maintain cooperation with other humans in a stable social 
environment.
16
 This is the absolute presupposition of Hume’s argument.17  
Because the need for society is defined as a product of the passions, argued to be the 
dominant force opposed to reason in the dialectic of human nature, Hume describes the 
individual in terms of the association of ideas in the human mind that produces a particular 
category of sentiment: fellow-feeling or sympathy.
18
 Sympathy provides a fundamental basis for 
a morality of passions; the development or encouragement of sympathy with others grants moral 
value to human action. However, the development of this sympathetic predisposition is 
countered in the human mind by the existence of a powerful opposite force from which the 
individual must be able to remove himself to create and maintain social organization: self-
interest. This tension defines the person within a dialectic struggle for her practical reason that 
finds its synthesis in Hume’s concept of “limited generosity.”19 This limited generosity, 
combined with empirical scarcity and general equality define Hume’s circumstances of justice.  
For Hume, no single, independent or a priori criterion for justice as an expression of 
practical reason exists. Justice is a process-norm, a level of sanctions beyond individual 
approbation of moral behavior by which the collective utility of social processes are identified 
and protected from disturbance. Justice is based on the mutual respect human beings share for 
                                                          
15
 Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. Edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge and P.H. Nidditch. 5th. ed. (Oxford 
1978) at 485-486, 526, 543. 
16
 Buckle, Stephen. Natural Law and the Theory of Property: Grotius to Hume (Oxford 1991) and Gillroy, John 
Martin. Justice-As-Sovereignty: The Source of Practical Reason As Utility In International Law [Manuscript]. 
17
 Gillroy, John Martin. Justice-As-Sovereignty [Manuscript]; John W. Danford. David Hume and the Problem of 
Reason: Recovering the Human Sciences (Yale 1990). 
18
 Hume, Treatise 470, 472, 478, 484. 
19
 Hume, Treatise 487-488. 
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the stability of one-another’s property.20 Justice is the result of social pressure as the complexity 
of interaction forces a more formal and universal norm to establish, or reestablish, an enlightened 
sense of public well-being linked to social order. Justice is both allocative and distributive, a 
means and an end, a source, locus, and scope for society, and simultaneously both a normative 
and empirical concept. 
Applied to international law, the complexities of Hume’s definition of collective action 
find synthesis in the concept of justice-as-order or justice-as-sovereignty, as a process-norm that 
secures the reciprocal cooperation of states and the stability or ‘effective control’ of property in 
legal practice. The overlapping dynamics of social evolution, to compensate for the 
circumstances of justice and the dynamic complexity of human social interaction, must settle 
upon a process-norm; that is, a norm that is neutral between specific manifestations or principles 
of property, but created by the fact that a process that stabilizes property achieves a consensus 
that justice is meant to represent and defend. Here, the process of cooperation is both the means 
to justice and the ends of justice itself. For Hume’s philosophical-policy, justice is order, or the 
stable coordination of human interaction, where one’s sympathy to fundamental social interests 
requires an additional level of sanction to persist. Justice is also that pattern of allocation and 
distribution that solves the collective action problem and assures a stable social order. In effect, 
as the dialectic between sympathyself-interest evolves and overlaps with the dynamics of the 
empirical world, justice-as-sovereignty is a means for incorporating new social facts over time, 
while protecting the essential coordination of (e.g., international) society. 
In order to describe the full transference of individual habit into social expectation of 
moral behavior, Hume utilizes the idea of evolving social convention. Conventions are not 
customs,
21
 but those unconsciously learned rules which set the parameters of action in terms of 
                                                          
20
 Hume, Treatise 491. 
21
 Specifically, social convention has three critical distinctions from the standard positivist assumptions about 
custom adopted by H. L. A. Hart in his Concept of Law (Oxford 1961). First, Humean social convention is built on 
an innate dialectic between practice and the generation of rules that makes social convention inherently efficacious 
in that it exists specifically to solve a collective action problem and is motivated by the passion for society and 
social order, upon which its public utility depends. Second, conventional practice, within Hume’s philosophical-
policy, endows all informal and formal legal rules with a dialectic between external patterns of human behavior and 
the ‘internal’ moral aspects of those rules. Unlike Hart’s concept of law, which assumes custom has no inherent 
sense of justice or morality, Hume argues that social convention, even in its pre-legal form, evolves the sanctions of 
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the requirements of justice, thereby stabilizing social order. The further growth and universal 
spread of convention is dependent on consensus over an equilibrium and process-norm that 
provide a moral focus for just order adding moral obligation to action through the ‘artificial’ 
maxims of justice. Here the dialectic connection between the empirical and the normative 
becomes critical to the establishment and persistence of society. 
Duty, promise, and transference by consent become possible only with the establishment 
of the social convention of justice as a process-norm.
22
 On route, morality, through a sympathy 
for the general interest, lends approbation and obligation to anything that supports society and 
denies it to that which tends to social disintegration. Morality is a necessary foundation and 
reinforcement of one's sense of justice and provides an added sanction for social stability, beyond 
that provided by the protection of one’s ‘honor’.23 With justice, individual sympathy becomes 
reinforced by a concrete sense of the public interest that articulates the utility of society and 
further realigns self-interest to collective ends.
24
 
Hume's contention that society can and does establish itself with the process-norm of 
justice alone, and without formal institutional governance, is based on the premise that society 
remains homogeneous, small and simple.
25
 Justice as social convention is necessary in the 
formation of society to stabilize property and ascribe moral virtue to the support of the public 
interest. But, like the preceding moral approbation that sanctioned social order, justice alone is 
not always sufficient to assure a stable and evolving society. This creates a role for the law. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
justice based on morality before the advent of political society or codified law. A third difference between Hart and 
Hume is that one can uniquely identify a core dialectic of processprinciple from Hume’s philosophical-policy, that 
is generic to Hume’s concept of law and foundational to all rules generated by practice. By engaging the validity of 
the law and its moral authority in a dialectic between, respectively, procedural and substantive rules, Hume’s 
philosophical-policy avoids the minefield of the dichotomy between valid law and moral law. In effect, the 
relationship between Hart’s primary and secondary rules is, for Hume, reversed so that procedural rules become 
prerequisite to substantive rules and is a creature of his essential dialectic between processprinciple; rule validity 
is inherently part of morality. See, John Martin Gillroy Justice-As-Sovereignty [Manuscript] at Chapter 3.  
22
 Hume, Treatise 516. 
23
 Hume, Treatise 501. 
24
 There is confusion as to the exact role utility plays in Hume’s philosophy. In the Treatise he begins with self-
interest but finds utility only in the collective good (472). In the Enquiries he begins with the case for the utility of 
social convention and ends with its relationship to self-love (174). While it is popular to consider Hume a father of 
English Utilitarianism, some see the utility argument as less than central. See Miller, David. Philosophy and 
Ideology in Hume’s Political Thought (Oxford 1981). 
25
 Hume, Treatise 499. 
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Before public policy and legal institutions, the conventions of justice and its resulting 
social order are at risk of collapse as society becomes more complex. Considering that the 
passion for society is still of paramount importance to humanity, a further and formal refinement 
must be made to the empirical circumstances of justice to provide a long-term solution to the 
integrity of collective action. The conscious creation of government institutions through Humean 
contract-by-convention is the solution. What Hume calls “political society”26 finds its genesis in 
the formal reconfirmation of personal utility in the collective interest. 
As justice empowers limited generosity by compensating for the tendencies of self-
interest to undermine society, the role of the state is to add institutional structure and sanction to 
established social conventions. Consequently, social convention, originating in moral 
approbation with the conventions of justice to insure performance, gains the formal social 
sanction of government and codified law to support it. Now, larger social groups are more 
permanently able to coordinate themselves in the face of the dynamic evolution of human nature. 
Government is not based on a distinct or stronger obligation than justice requires, but governance 
combined with justice has a cumulative and more powerful effect on individual cooperation. 
Each overlaps and builds on the other, with the social stability of larger and more complex 
communities as their common end.
27
 
Utilizing Hume’s philosophical-policy as a paradigm for international law, his basic 
dialectic between passionreason generates a concept of law with these two foundational source 
of dialectic interaction. Based on this dialectic and given Hume’s emphasis on passion over 
reason with his connection between passion and social convention, we can identify a central 
legal dialectic for the international system in the tension between processprinciple as 
foundations for rules. Here the former provides a basis for law in social convention created from 
the passions and their requirements in terms of the process of human cooperation, while the latter 
is characterized by critical principle based in reason and the inherent requirements of humanity-
in-the person. Both are factors in the definition of justice, with a strong balance toward process. 
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This core dialectic also has ramifications for the definition of the idea of a ‘principle’ 
within the legal system. With the establishment of contract-by-convention and political 
institutions, Hume’s ‘political society’ is finally able to fully engage the traditional definition of 
principle as a standard based on reason and critical of social convention. However, before 
government, justice still required that certain principles be established as a basis for rules that 
support social convention and its process norm. These principles derive their meaning from 
social convention and are therefore contextual principles to the ends of process and social 
stability.  
Applying Hume’s philosophical-policy to law therefore requires careful attention to 
which definition of principle is being used. Are they independent of social convention and 
necessary or essential to humanity-in-the-person and therefore critical principles or are they 
completely contextual to social convention and therefore contextual principles. For example, the 
idea of dignity can be argued as either a contextual or critical principle. As a contextual principle 
it acquires its meaning from the social circumstances around which the stable society is formed. 
It is defined, externally to the individual, by social convention and requires that the dignity of the 
person be judged collectively. As a critical principle, dignity is defined by the requirements of 
reason and individual autonomy independent of social convention. It is defined internally, by the 
ability of the person to maintain their integrity.
28
 While many principles can be defined either 
way, the way they are defined is important to the manner in which the philosophical argument 
relates to both the definition of justice and the practice of the law. Does the principle come from 
the passions and defend process and social convention, giving its idea of justice the character of 
jus dispositivum, or does it have essential or preemptive character from reason, granting its 
subject jus cogens status? 
Overall, the balance of process and principle within the core dialectic defines justice as 
simultaneously both an empirical condition of stable coordination and a normative imperative to 
maintain that equilibrium. Hume’s argument for justice creates a synthesis where process and its 
contextual principles, or the need to stabilize property as a means to cooperation, outweighs any 
preemptive definition of justice in terms of specific critical principles or ends. But just as he 
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promotes the passions over reason without eliminating the latter as a part of human nature, he 
promotes process and contextual principle over preemptive law and critical principle without 
denying the existence of the latter in shaping the process-norm of justice and the positive law. 
For Hume, the stability of the process of collective action is the paramount requirement of the 
human passion for society.
29
 To the degree that the introduction of a preemptive principle critical 
of this process would be disruptive to its stability, it is discounted and discouraged within the 
logic of concepts that generates social convention. In this way, Hume’s definition of justice is 
necessarily biased toward process. 
Applying Hume’s Philosophical-Policy to the issue of public order principles in 
international law produces a series of insights. First, that legal practice, as a generic concept, has 
two overlapping foundations for its positive law. First, those international social conventions and 
contextual principles that came from pre-legal social convention and, second, conscious, reason-
based critical principles that transcend the reciprocal relations of states. The former can be 
described as the basis of jus dispositivum and the latter understood as the realm of peremptory 
norms made up of jus cogens principles and erga omnes obligations. These two foundations for 
international legal validity and obligation are not eristically independent or distinct and 
dichotomous foundations for the study of law. One is not separate, or irrelevant to the study of 
the other, within Hume’s concept of law; they overlap within his logic of concepts as represented 
by the core dialectic of processprinciple.  
The second insight is that international legal practice ought to be biased toward the 
process side of the dialectic. The process-norm of justice-as-sovereignty
30
 draws its status from 
its ability to maintain the stable coordination of the international society of states. As made 
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evident in the 1927 Lotus case,
31
 sovereignty, as that norm which defines the modern legal 
system, creates a prohibitive system of legal practice. 
... international law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law 
binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will. Restrictions upon the 
independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.
32
 
 
A third insight is that the dynamic quality of the law is increasingly fostering a more 
balanced core dialectic where critical principle (e.g., rights, freedom, integrity) gains strength 
and threatens the dominance of process and justice-as-sovereignty within the international legal 
system. With the advent of contract-by-convention, and the institutions of international 
governance, reason can compete with the passions as a counterweight to social conventions that 
while good at stable social order are not adequate to the protection of humanity-in-the-person. 
This requires Hume’s concept of law to accommodate at least two stages or levels of complexity 
in its scale of forms: a Stage-I and Stage-II legal system. The former operationalizes a 
processprinciple dialectic weighted toward process; the latter a legal system that can adapt to 
the rise of critical principle.  
A CPA For Legality of Nuclear Weapons: A Logic of Investigation Informed 
by Hume’s Logic of Concepts 
The complicated decision of the majority in Nuclear Weapons takes place within a more 
developed international legal system than existed when the Permanent Court of International 
Justice (PCIJ) decided the Lotus case and it illustrates that a transition to a Stage-II international 
legal system is underway. However, the majority still relied on social convention with contextual 
principles and process-norms verifying the staying power of a process-centered international law 
based on justice-as-sovereignty. By refusing to make the use of nuclear weapons illegal, the 
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Court apparently discounts the critical principles (i.e., of humanitarian, armed conflict and 
environmental law) within the contemporary public order debate. 
In the first procedural decision of the Court, the judges decided to switch the question 
from whether international law existed that would permit the use of nuclear weapons to a search 
for a specific prohibition against the use of such weapons. This reconceptualization of the 
argument, a direct application of the Lotus case, recognizes that sovereignty is a process-norm, 
while it relies on the underlying assumption that the legal burden of proof lies with those who 
would prohibit a state’s actions. 
The use of the word “permitted” in the question put by the General Assembly was 
criticized before the Court by certain States on the ground that this implied that the threat 
or use of nuclear weapons would only be permissible if authorization could be found in a 
treaty provision or in customary international law. Such a starting point, those States 
submitted, was incompatible with the very basis of international law, which rests upon 
the principles of sovereignty and consent; accordingly, and contrary to what was implied 
by use of the word “permitted”, States are free to threaten or use nuclear weapons unless 
it can be shown that they are bound not to do so by reference to a prohibition in either 
treaty law or customary international law. Support for this contention was found in dicta 
of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the “Lotus” case…” [quoting ICJ 
Reports 1986 p.135 ¶269-Nic] ‘in international law there are no rules, other than such 
rules as may be accepted by the States concerned, by treaty or otherwise, whereby the 
level of armaments of a sovereign State can be limited’ ... 33 
 
With the establishment of Lotus sovereignty as the point of departure for the examination 
of the question, the Court could have simply let this process-norm maintain the legality of 
nuclear weapons without further argument. However, in the years since Lotus, the status of 
critical principle in legal argument had advanced. In addition to the progress of human rights law 
which had been established by both treaty and the UN Charter, humanitarian law had been more 
thoroughly codified in both war and peace. International environmental law, seeking to protect 
the integrity of nature, had also been incorporated in treaty, principle, and custom. Most 
critically, the ideas of erga omnes obligations, containing the seeds of universal jurisdiction, and 
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jus cogens critical principles, as the most important class of preemptive norms or substantive 
moral principles of law, were both codified, the former in case law and the latter in treaty.
34
 
 Consequently, the Court was not able to dismiss critical principle altogether as the Lotus 
Court did. Instead, they proceeded to search the treaty and customary law of armed conflict, 
human rights and environmental as well as humanitarian law for a prohibition of the use of 
nuclear weapons. This search uncovered many ‘obligations’ that the sovereign state would be 
legally expected to take into account. For example, from the law of environmental protection:  
The existence of general obligation of States to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or areas beyond national 
control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the environment”...35 
The Court thus finds that while the existing international law relating to the protection 
and safeguarding of the environment does not specifically prohibit the use of nuclear 
weapons, it indicates important environmental factors that are properly to be taken into 
account …”36 
 
However, these obligations were judged not to be erga omnes, nor as coming from 
jus cogens or critical principles, so they were insufficient to provide a preemptive prohibition 
against the use of nuclear weapons.  
The logic of the Court, and its ultimate decision, are not based on any of the many 
jus cogens elements of human rights or humanitarian law, but on the concept of self-defense. 
Applying the lens of Hume’s philosophical-policy, we can say that the Court had a choice of 
defining the idea of self-defense as a critical principle (i.e., jus cogens) or as a contextual 
principle informed by the process-norm of justice-as-sovereignty (i.e., jus dispositivum). They 
chose the latter.  
Their use of self-defense is contextual in the sense that it is dependent for its meaning on 
the idea of state sovereignty. The majority settled on a sense of self-defense conditioned by a 
Lotus idea of independence, measured by the jus dispositivum norms of proportionality and 
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necessity.
37
 This demonstrates that, not only did the Court allow justice-as-sovereignty to retain 
its character as a core process-norm protecting collective action, it moved the argument away 
from peremptory norms altogether, keeping it within the realm of jus dispositivum where process 
is advantaged. If they had argued self-defense as a peremptory norm,
38
 it would have to be 
separated from the social conventions of sovereignty and judged independently. That would have 
opened a debate over the jus cogens status of the other humanitarian, environmental and rights-
based preemptive ideas within the case working against the legality of nuclear weapons. 
Logically, this could have forced a different outcome, which was avoided.  
The process nature of its definition of self-defense is confirmed in the Court’s insistence 
that the measures of a state’s sovereign defense would be proportionality and necessity. The 
standards of necessity and proportionality are measures not of critical but contextual principle, 
not jus cogens but jus dispositivum. If these limiting conditions were being judged as jus cogens 
or erga omnes then, as critical principle, they would need to be considered, by definition, a 
matter of inherent necessity. A preemptive norm contains its own moral causality and is never 
measured continuously but discreetly; it either exists (e.g., within the law, or within morality) or 
it does not. For example, a right against genocide does not bend to necessity of circumstance or 
proportionality, but, once acknowledged, continues to exist regardless of degree. This is why a 
state’s argument that exigent circumstances make violation of a jus cogens principle legal does 
not change the international law on the subject, nor the state’s responsibility.  
Proportionality is also not a test of preemptive norms. One cannot be proportionately 
tortured, nor is the genocide of one states’ citizens a fit legal basis for the proportional genocide 
of another’s nationals. If self-defense was a critical principle in the mind of the Court, then the 
tests of necessity and proportionality would not be required. The fact that they do apply these 
conditioning tests is evidence that they understand self-defense in terms of what Hume’s concept 
of law defines as a contextual principle, subject to consent and the voluntary rules of social 
convention within a law of jus dispositivum.  
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With the contextual principle of self-defense in hand, the majority then produces a 
finding that there are circumstances in which the use of nuclear weapons are legally justified.
39
  
First, the Court concludes that there is no direct prohibition on the use of nuclear 
weapons, which basically removes the decision from the realm of jus cogens. Second, based on 
the law of jus dispositivum, it maintains that state sovereignty and its defense cannot rule out a 
scenario where proportionality and necessity will require one state to use nuclear weapons to 
save itself from annihilation.
40
 One explanation for what is commonly considered a complex 
argument is that the Court was desperately trying to avoid a situation where no law was available 
to answer its central question (i.e., non liquet).
41
 But there was a great variety of law in this case 
from which to choose. The critical dimension of the majority decision, from the standpoint of 
Hume’s philosophical-policy and legal design, is in its acknowledgement, on the one hand, that 
critical principles were involved and, on the other, that since none of them had achieved 
jus cogens or erga omnes status, it was more important to provide for those extreme 
circumstances within jus dispositivum where a sovereign state has to act in self-defense given 
dire risk.  
The Court’s opinion can be interpreted, first, as recognizing the conventional roots of the 
contextual principle of self-defense as a creature of justice-as-sovereignty. In the same way that 
the conventional definition of international legal practice was critical in the reorientation of the 
case toward ‘prohibition’, it also provided the basis for the dialectic between process (i.e., self-
defense measured by necessity and proportionality) and critical principle (e.g., humanitarian law) 
that characterizes the central arguments about nuclear weapons and the law of force, 
humanitarian law, and environmental protection that make up the opinion.  
Further evidence for the Court’s unconscious recognition, but predisposition against, the 
evolving dialectic between processprinciple, can be found in the Judge Weeramantry’s dissent. 
He acknowledges the predominance of social convention from Lotus but with the contention that 
                                                          
39
 Chazournes, Laurence Boisson de, and Philippe Sands, eds. International Law, the International Court of Justice 
and Nuclear Weapons. 
40
 Nuclear Weapons para.96. “...the Court cannot lose sight of the fundamental right of every State to survival, and 
thus its right to resort to self-defense, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter, when its survival is at stake.”  
41
 Chazournes, Laurence Boisson de, and Philippe Sands, eds. International Law, the International Court of Justice 
and Nuclear Weapons. 
 Simons Papers in Security and Development No. 20/2012      24 
 
the progress of critical principle over process needs to be more actively acknowledged by the 
Court. 
... the absence of specific illegality was anchored to the “Lotus” decision. 
It would have been furthest from the mind of the Court deciding that case that its dictum 
…would be used in an attempt to negate all that the humanitarian laws of war had built 
up—for the interpretation now sought to be given to the “Lotus” case is nothing less than 
that it overrides even such well-entrenched principles as the Martens clause,
 42
 which 
expressly provides that its humanitarian principles would apply “in cases not included in 
the Regulations adopted by them.” 
… [as the Permanent Court, years earlier had observed] … the sovereignty of states 
would be proportionately diminished and restricted as international law developed. … 
In the half century that has elapsed since the “Lotus” case, it is quite evident that 
international law—and the law relating to humanitarian conduct in war—have developed 
considerably, imposing additional restrictions on state sovereignty over and above those 
that existed at the time of the “Lotus” case…This Court cannot in 1996 construe “Lotus” 
so narrowly as to take the law backward in time even beyond the Martens clause.
43
 
 
Conclusion: Hume’s CPA, Convention and Public Order Principles  
Hume’s philosophical-policy suggests that the uphill battle of reasoned principle against 
instinctual process and social convention provides an explanation for the split between the 
majority and dissent on this issue. It is not that human reason exists only to obfuscate or justify 
choices arrived at by the operation of sentiment through social convention, but that this is the 
predisposition of anyone with the experience of stability under social convention. Hume’s insight 
here is that unconscious human interaction creates social stability out of the expression of the 
passions where reason begins as is its ‘slave’.  
With the advent of governance and the introduction of critical principle as a 
counterweight to social convention, reason acquires a new role in international law. Applying 
philosophical method and Hume’s philosophical-policy the law will acknowledge the dialectic of 
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processprinciple. Social conventions will be subjected to the test of whether they empower or 
harm those critical principles that represent preemptive concerns for humanity-in-the-person. 
The use of the public order/policy process in international law, as exemplified in Legality of 
Nuclear Weapons, demonstrates that the instinctual power of social convention and its tendency 
to reduce reflective reason and the role of its critical principles erodes over time, but very slowly.  
Although the ICJ, between 1966 and 1995, had evolved to the point where reflective 
reason was a consideration in the judgment of Lotus sovereignty, it had not advanced so far as to 
acknowledge the basic protections of humanitarian or environmental law through codification as 
peremptory jus cogens principles or erga omnes obligations. The majority decision in this case 
continues to support the fundamental role of justice-as-sovereignty within international legal 
practice and the continued dominance of a Lotus definition of jus dispositivum. 
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